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SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
During the past survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued two opinions in the securities area involving controversial theo-
ries of recovery which have divided the circuits.' In Christy v. Cambron,
2
the court relaxed the criteria of the sale of business doctrine to encom-
pass a transfer of less than a 100% interest in a business to four purchas-
ers in varying proportions. The court found that the stock shares issued
were only indicia of ownership and not "securities" subject to the regu-
lations of the 1933 Act s and the 1934 Act 4 and its corresponding rules.
5
In T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority,
6
the Tenth Circuit recognized the fraud on the market theory of liability
for the first time, adopting perhaps the most expansive view of any cir-
cuit. This theory allows plaintiffs to rely on the integrity of the trading
market and does not require them to prove actual reliance on a specific
fraudulent act to establish causation in a lOb-5 action.
This article compares the positions of the Tenth Circuit to other
jurisdictions on both the sale of business doctrine and the fraud on the
market theory of liability. First, the article explores the early cases and
their supporting rationales. Second, it analyzes and compares the con-
flicting lines of cases in both areas. Third, it discusses the application of
precedent by the Tenth Circuit in Christy and Raney. Finally, it suggests
possible ramifications of these decisions.
1. In an unpublished opinion, SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., No. 82-1954 (10th
Cir. Sept. 19, 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
Federal District Court of Colorado's granting of an injunction against the defendants for
violations of securities regulations. The defendant, the best efforts underwriter on an all
or nothing offering of shares and warrants of a start-up corporation, engaged in several
large transactions for its own account when it appeared that the entire offering would not
be sold by the deadline. Since these transactions did not qualify as bona fide purchases,
the continuation of distribution by the defendant from its own account subsequent to the
closing date was a violation of Rule lOb-6(c)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 6240.10b-6(c)(3) (1984). Be-
cause the all or nothing offering failed to close, the defendant was obligated to make re-
funds. This was not done and Rule lOb-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1984), was violated.
Also, the escrow account was improperly managed because funds were disbursed prior to
the closing of the offering. This was a violation of Rule 15c-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-4
(1984). The appellate court also found the defendants' argument that aider and abettor
liability was not a component of securities regulation unpersuasive. Finally, the evidence
of manipulations and non-disclosures supported the trial court's determination that the
defendant had violated the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1982), the 1934 Act, section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
2. 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).
3. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
4. The Securities Exchange Commission Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
5. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.0-1 to .31-1 (1983).
6. 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1285 (1984).
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I. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE
A. Christy v. Cambron
In Christy v. Cambron,7 plaintiffs Kelly Christy, Hunt Klein, Richard
Loose, and Pearse Nolan each made capital contributions to a new cor-
poration, Mark Cambron, Inc., which was formed by the defendant,
Mark Cambron, to build and own a discotheque in Vail, Colorado. Each
plaintiff became a director and officer of the corporation 8 and received
shares reflecting his or her contribution to the start-up capital fund.
The plaintiffs' capital contributions totalled $97,160, but the prepara-
tion costs for opening the disco were only approximately $50,000. Pur-
suant to the pre-incorporation agreements signed by plaintiffs,
Cambron received the balance remaining in the start-up fund after prep-
aration expenditures, about $40,000, as compensation. 9
Due to insufficient financing and poor economic conditions in
Vail, 10 the disco operated for less than three months. Shortly after it
closed, it was sold to a third party who eventually defaulted on the pay-
ments. Cambron and plaintiffs repossessed the property and listed it
with a realtor, Trevor T. Bradway Company. Defendant Ernest Crates
purchased the disco through a Bradway agent with the intention of im-
mediately reselling it for a profit. Because of the poor economic condi-
tions in Vail, Crates was unable to resell and sustained a loss.
Plaintiffs filed suit in the Federal District Court of Colorado alleging
that Cambron violated rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission I I and Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.12 They fur-
ther contended that Cambron breached his fiduciary duty as an
incorporator under Colorado law. Crates counterclaimed against plain-
tiffs and cross-claimed against Cambron alleging fraud in the sale of
Mark Cambron, Inc. stock to him and violation of securities laws and
regulations. Crates also cross-claimed against Cambron for breach of
fiduciary duty. A third party claim by Crates against Trevor T. Bradway
Company settled prior to trial.
The jury returned verdicts for plaintiffs against Cambron on their
three claims for relief and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.
Crates received verdicts against all plaintiffs and Cambron. Plaintiffs
and Cambron filed motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. Crates moved for a new trial on the issue of damages only.
The court granted Cambron's motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and dismissed the case in its entirety. 13 Plaintiffs appealed to
7. 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).
8. The court noted that "[pilaintiffs were involved in running the disco . Id. at
671. See infra text accompanying notes 46-47.
9. 710 F.2d at 671.
10. During the winter ski season of 1975-76, the Vail area experienced inadequate
snowfall and a fatal gondola mishap, causing adverse national publicity.
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
13. "Reasons given by the trial court ... were that . . .(1) the dispute did not in-
volve a "security" ...; (2) there was no causal relationship between the plaintiffs' losses
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the Tenth Circuit contending that the trial court erred in granting that
motion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to dis-
miss the case.
1 4
B. Defining a "Security"
The circuits are divided on whether shares of corporate stock trans-
ferred as part of a sale of a business qualify as "securities" within the
meaning of the Securities Acts.1 5 Some jurisdictions evaluate all stock
according to its character and do not distinguish among the various con-
texts in which shares of stock can be transferred. 16 Other jurisdictions
follow a transactional approach and classify stock transferred in the sale
of a business as merely the medium of exchange through which the busi-
ness assets are purchased. 1 7 In these circuits, these shares of stock are
and any misrepresentations or omissions by Cambron; and (3) Crates' claims were not
supported by the evidence." 710 F.2d at 672.
14. In considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, trial courts
analyze evidence "in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. at 671. Specifically, the
court stated that the motion could "not be granted unless the evidence is susceptible of no
reasonable inferences that sustain the position of the party against whom the motion is
made with respect to one or more of the necessary elements of each claim . (cita-
tions omitted). Id. at 672.
15. Section 2 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982) states:
[Ulnless the context otherwise requires-The term "security" means any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi-
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional un-
divided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index or securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof) or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relat-
ing to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Section 3 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982) states:
[U]nless the context otherwise requires-The term "security" means any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease,
any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit,
for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certifi-
cate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based in the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general,
any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include cur-
rency or any note, draft, bill or exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity date at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
While the definitions in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are not identical, they were
intended to reflect substantially the same meaning and have been so construed by the
courts. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934), cited in Villeneuve v. Advanced
Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (1 Ith Cir. 1983), affirmedon reh'g, 730 F.2d
1403 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en bane); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 342 (1967).
16. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
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not "securities," they are only indicia of ownership of the business as-
sets, and, consequently, the transfer of stock does not receive the pro-
tection of securities regulations.' 8 These opposing philosophies are
supported by conflicting interpretations of the same Supreme Court
case, United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman. 9
The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits focus on the
character of the instrument transferred and disregard the nature of the
underlying transaction. 20 They interpret part II.A. of the Forman opin-
ion as providing securities regulation coverage to any instruments which
have the characteristics of stock. These attributes include recognition as
stock for the purposes of corporate, commercial, and tax law; the oppor-
tunity of holders to receive dividends, to vote, and to realize apprecia-
tion in value upon sale; and the capacity to transfer to others or to
pledge. 2 ' This approach adopts a literal application of the definition of
"securities." Only if the instruments lack the traditional characteristics
of stock will these courts apply the "economic realities" analysis from
part II.B. of the Forman opinion.
The Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the "eco-
nomic realities" approach, set forth in part II.B. of Forman, which advo-
cates a flexible interpretation of the security definition.
2 2 Under this
18. Id.
19. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
20. Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.) (plaintiff purchased 50% of cor-
poration's outstanding stock from defendant, the sole shareholder, and as consideration
promised to pay a specified sum and devote certain efforts to the business.), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 428 (1984); Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983) (three plaintiffs
purchased all the outstanding shares of a corporation from the two defendants and as-
sumed managerial control of the business.); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696
F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982) (Seagrave Corp., a closely-held family corporation, purchased
from Vista Resources, Inc. all the assets of 29 of its subsidiary corporations including real
property, machinery, equipment, and stock which was listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change.), revg 534 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2341, cert. dis-
missed, 105 S. Ct. 23 (1984); Cole v. PPG Indus., Inc., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting the sale of business doctrine on a claim filed under the Arkansas Securities Stat-
utes relying on Forman.); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs
purchased 100% of the outstanding stock of an existing corporation from defendant, its
sole shareholder.); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff sold his entire
50% interest of a corporation to defendant, who owned the other 50% interest.); Coffin v.
Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979) (discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 43-44).
21. Seagrave Corp., 696 F.2d at 229.
22. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.) (plaintiffs purchased
100% of corporation's outstanding stock and retained seller as an advisory consultant for
one year.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984); Chandler v. KEW, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th
Cir. 1977) (discussed in the text accompanying note 42); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197
(7th Cir. 1982) (created the rebuttable presumption that if the purchaser already has, or by
the purchase in question acquires, more than 50% of the common stock of the corpora-
tion, his purpose in purchasing the stock will be presumed to have been entrepreneurship
rather than investment; thus, the sale of business doctrine is recognized.); King v. Winkler,
673 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1982) (discussed in the text accompanying notes 38-41); Frederik-
sen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.) (discussed in the text accompanying note 40), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); see Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business"
Doctrine under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637 (1982); Thompson, The Shrinking
Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock Is NAot a Federal Security Transac-
tion, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1982).
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approach, a transaction evidenced by the sale of "stock" is not necessar-
ily a security transaction even though the statutory definition of security
includes the words "any. . .stock."'2 3 This analysis focuses on the sub-
stance and purpose of the transaction and de-emphasizes its form and
label.24 The circuits following this analysis do not regard fulfillment of
the part II.A. stock attribute requirements of Forman as conclusive. They
also apply the three-part Howey-Forman "economic realities" test 25 to de-
termine if the transaction evidenced by a transfer of stock is governed by
the federal securities regulations. The elements of this analysis are:
(1) an investment, (2) in a common venture, (3) with a reasonable expec-
tation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others. 26 These courts interpret Forman to require satisfaction
of the part II.B. requirements in order to classify an exchange or trans-
fer as a securities transaction.
The first element, presence of an investment, is fulfilled if the inves-
tor commits "his assets to an enterprise or venture in such a manner as
to subject himself to a financial lOSS." ' 2 7 To qualify as an investment, the
investor must give up a tangible and definable consideration. In return,
he receives a separate financial interest that has, substantially, the char-
acteristics of a security.
28
The second element, a common enterprise, has been defined as
"one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and de-
pendant upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investments
of third parties."
29
Some courts analyze the third element in two parts: (1) was there a
reasonable expectation of profit? and (2) was this profit to be derived
from the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts of others? It is the sec-
ond part of this element that was determinative in most cases. 30 This
second component previously required profits to be derived "solely"
from the efforts of others.3 1 The courts no longer construe the term
"solely" literally; instead, they examine the quality and quantity of the
23. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848; 45 SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. at 336.
24. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848 (citing Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336).
25. Howey extended coverage of the federal securities laws by creating a three-part
analysis to define an "investment contract." Thirty years later, Forman, in limiting protec-
tion of the federal laws, adopted a modified version of the Howey test and labelled it the
'economic realities" approach.
26. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852; Howey, 328 U.S: at 301; Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 1980).
27. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976); Wooldridge Homes, Inc. v.
Bronze Tree, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (D. Colo. 1983); SEC v. International Mining
Exch., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (D. Colo. 1981).
28. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979) (the court
found that employees' contributions to a noncontributory, compulsory pension fund did
not constitute an investment.)
29. SEC v. Glenn Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.) (citing Los Angeles
Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
919 (1961)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
30. See Thompson, supra note 22, at 238-39.
31. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
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efforts performed by both parties. 3 2 The Tenth Circuit has adopted the
following interpretive test: "whether the efforts made by those other
than the investor are undeniably significant ones, those essential efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." 3 3 Contribution of
time and effort are not the only factors examined. The focus is on the
degree of ultimate control over the operations of the business. 34 There-
fore, the reliance of the investor on the promoter or third parties does
not have to be complete, as long as the duties performed by the investor
are nominal or limited and have an inconsequential impact in the suc-
cess of the enterprise.
3 5
C. Rationalizing the Facts with the Law
Typically, the sale of business doctrine has been applied to transac-
tions where the investor acquired 100% of the outstanding stock and
assumed control of the corporation.3 6 This transaction is classified as
the sale of a business through the sale of stock. The substance of the
transaction is the purchase of a business and the stock is regarded as the
medium of exchange and merely an indicia of ownership. In Christy,
plaintiffs collectively acquired an eighty-one percent interest in Mark
Cambron, Inc., each holding various numbers of shares proportionate
to their investment, and defendant Cambron continued to serve as the
organizer and promoter of the corporation. The court chose to extend
the sale of business doctrine to this situation, finding that plaintiffs did
not expect profits based on Cambron's efforts. 37 The court, however,
failed to adequately address the issue of control, raising the question of
the extent to which an investor or purchaser can be involved in manage-
ment without invoking the doctrine.
In a footnote, the court cited King v. Winkler,3 8 an Eleventh Circuit
opinion, for the proposition that "[a] sale of less than 100% of the stock
32. Turner, 474 F.2d at 482.
33. Aldrich, 627 F.2d at 1040 n.3 (quoting Turner, 474 F.2d at 482).
34. Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 877, 880 (10th Cir. 1978).
35. Commander's Palace Park Ass'n v. Girard & Pastel Corp., 572 F.2d 1084, 1086
(5th Cir. 1978); Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1978); Fargo Partners v.
Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 1976); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211
(10th Cir. 1975); Lino v. City Inv. Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting SEC Act
Release No. 5211 (November 30, 1971), reported in [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 78446 at page 80,973).
36. Until the decision in Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982), all circuit
court cases applying the sale of business doctrine involved a transfer of 100% of the cor-
poration's outstanding stock. In Sutter, the Seventh Circuit created an investor-entrepre-
neur distinction and established a rebuttable presumption that one holding 50% or more
of a corporation's stock is an entrepreneur and the sale of the business doctrine applies to
a transfer of this interest. The Tenth Circuit has joined this minority view but failed to
discuss Sutter, possibly because none of the interests transferred equalled a 50% share by
itself.
37. After examining the evidence, the court concluded that while the venture included
potentially fraudulent elements, these elements failed to develop into a legally actionable
claim. Thus, the court could have denied recovery for the plaintiffs because no fraud ex-
isted without expanding the sale of business doctrine to include the unique factual ele-
ments of Christy.
38. 673 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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might not be covered by the [Securities] Acts. A sale of 100% of the
stock can be covered by the Acts."' 39 King involved the transfer of an
existing business through the private sale of the sole shareholder's en-
tire interest in the corporate stock to two purchasers who intended to
manage and operate the business. The passage quoted from King con-
tinues, stating that "[t]he number of sellers and purchasers will not nec-
essarily control the outcome."'40 While the King court stated that the
approach used to resolve the case was not a "function of numbers,"' 4'
the facts in King resemble the classic sale of business doctrine case. The
purpose of the transaction in King was to sell all of the business assets.
There were no numbers with which the court had to struggle. The sole
shareholder sold his entire interest and completely relinquished control
over the business assets and the purchasers assumed complete control
of the business and its success or failure depended on their efforts alone.
The statement quoted in the Christy opinion does not reflect the true
precedential value of King.
The Christy court cited Chandler v. KEW, Inc. 4 2 as the authority for
classifying Christy as a sale of business doctrine case. Chandler, although
published five years after it was decided, was the first post-Forman appel-
late court recognition of the sale of business doctrine. It involved the
sale of a liquor store where the purchaser received 100% of the stock in
the transfer and assumed control of the business. Chandler is the prece-
dent for the sale of business doctrine in the Tenth Circuit, but unlike
Christy, it represents the typical, classic sale of business doctrine case.
The Christy court failed to distinguish a more analogous Fourth Circuit
case, Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc.
43
Polishing Machines, Inc. was interested in obtaining financing to ex-
pand its business. This objective was accomplished by selling fifty per-
cent of its outstanding stock to Coffin, who became its executive vice-
president. The Fourth Circuit characterized the transaction as "the very
sort of transfer with which the federal securities laws are most con-
cerned, 'the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making pur-
poses.' ",44 The Fourth Circuit declined to apply the economic realities
test and, instead, held that because the shares purchased by Coffin were
ordinary corporate stock, the transaction was subject to the federal se-
curities laws.
By way of contrast, in Frederiksen v. Poloway,4 5 the Seventh Circuit
applied the sale of business doctrine to the transfer of an existing busi-
ness through the purchase of 100% of its outstanding stock. The court
distinguished the Coffin decision on two grounds. First, Coffin did not
39. Id. at 346.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977) (initially published at [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. LAw REP. (CCH) $ 96,966 (10th Cir. 1977) at page 96,053).
43. 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1979).
44. Id. at 1204; see also Forman, 421 U.S. at 849.
45. 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1981).
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involve the transfer of 100% of the stock. Second, the Frederiksen court
determined that the purpose of the Coffin transaction had not been to
vest ownership of the business in the purchaser despite the fact that the
investor assumed the duties of executive vice-president. It found that
the economic reality of the Coffin transaction was the sale of stock to
raise capital to finance corporate expansion. It is not apparent from the
Frederiksen opinion how the Seventh Circuit would resolve cases similar
to Coffin, but its analysis demonstrates an awareness for distinguishing
facts and a concern for establishing possible parameters of the doctrine.
The analysis in Christy is not nearly as revealing. Given the mechan-
ical application of the Howey-Forinan test, the outcome of this case is pre-
dictable. The court conclusively stated that "[t]he economic realities
• . . show that plaintiffs were buying a discotheque, and there is no
question about that.' '46 The economic realities approach, however, pro-
motes substance over form, and requires careful application of the test's
three elements to the facts. Unfortunately, the court's rationale in
Christy does not include a discussion of the purpose of the transaction or
the extent of control retained by the plaintiffs over their investment and
its relation to their respective shares.
Cambron was seeking financial backing to build a discotheque. He
offered interests in his corporation, denominated in shares of stock, in
exchange for capital contributions needed to finance the discotheque. It
appears Cambron's motive for selling interests in his corporation was to
raise capital to build a discotheque and generate profits for himself and
the investors. When the plaintiffs made their investment in Mark Cam-
bron, Inc., the disco was only in the organizational stages and not yet
operational. It does not appear as obvious and conclusive as the court
indicated that plaintiffs were purchasing the discotheque. Indeed, the
opposite appears to be the more reasonable conclusion.
The court determined that the controlling issue was "not a matter
of numbers, but, rather, whether the purchaser of securities expects to
profit from the efforts of others."' 4 7 This interpretation indicates that in
the Tenth Circuit, the determinative factor in a sale of business transac-
tion is whether the investor exercises control over the interest acquired,
and not the medium through which the transaction was accomplished or
the underlying purpose of the transfer. In electing to focus on the con-
trol component, the Tenth Circuit has created a distinction between pas-
sive investors and those who choose to assume even a nominally active
role in controlling their newly acquired interest.
In reaching its holding, the court implies that the control exercised
by the four investors was more than nominal or limited and their efforts
were determinative to the success or failure of the enterprise. The
plaintiffs' only actions involved acquiescing to leasing rather than
purchasing the disco equipment and the firing of a group of employees
by plaintiff Klein. No executive responsibilities or actions were offered
46. Christy, 710 F.2d at 672.
47. Id. at n.1.
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to support the control factor. Moreover, the opinion indicates that the
minimal involvement of plaintiffs came in response to their after-the-fact
realization that the enterprise was undercapitalized. At the time Cam-
bron sold plaintiffs their interests, they had no intention of providing
anything other than capital.
The "efforts of others" requirement is an integral part of the eco-
nomic realities analysis and frequently operates to distinguish sale of
business transfers from securities transactions. It should not, however,
be considered determinative in every instance. The Christy court regards
the "efforts of others" element as conclusive and narrowly construes it
to require complete passivity on the part of the investor and exclusive
reliance on the efforts of third parties, even when financial demise be-
comes probable. This interpretation expands the sale of business doc-
trine beyond its original purpose and denies securities law coverage to
generally passive investors in enterprises managed primarily by
promoters.
II. THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY OF LIABILITY
IN lOb-5 ACTIONS
A. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel
Authority
In T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Author-
ity, 48 the Tenth Circuit considered the propriety of plaintiffs' claim as a
class action in an interlocutory appeal. 49 The complaint filed by the
plaintiff, TJ. Raney & Sons, Inc., a distributor of the Series C Bonds of
the Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority, alleged securities
fraud under Rule lOb-5 50 based on a form of the fraud on the market
theory. Raney claimed that the defendant bond counsel recklessly af-
firmed the validity of the bonds and concealed the wrongful divergence
of the proceeds. It contended that the bond proceeds were commingled
with other funds and never used for their intended purpose. Raney also
claimed that the bonds were unlawfully issued under Oklahoma law.
The Series C Bonds went into default and this class action ensued.
Raney sought to represent all Series C bondholders. There were
approximately sixty Series C bondholders with different degrees of in-
vestment experience. All the purchasers did not receive the same infor-
48. 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983).
49. In West v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 558 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1977), the
court explained the basis for the "Death Knell" exception of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)
which grants the court of appeals jurisdiction over the final decisions of the district courts.
To appeal a decertification order, plaintiffs must prove that the suit will not continue as a
private action if the class action is decertified.
In Bowe v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1977), the
court discussed the preferable means for review of class action orders under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1982) or through an extraordinary writ of mandamus. To qualify under
§ 1292(b), the order must involve a controlling question of law which "may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Id. at 644 n.l. The jurisdiction of the
court of appeals in this situation is discretionary.
50. 19 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983); see infra note 85 (text of Rule lOb-5).
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mation. Some received an allegedly fraudulent offering circular and
bond opinion before purchasing while others did not.
Defendants contended in their motion to decertify the class action
that this case was inappropriate as a class action because not all the class
members relied on the offering circular and the bond opinion. They
asserted that because causation could not be established with respect to
each class member, the claim as a class action must fail. They also
claimed that Raney was not a suitable class representative. It was a case
of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. 5 1
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to
decertify and recognized the plaintiffs' cause of action under a variation
of the fraud on the market theory of liability created in Shores v. Sklar 52
which allowed investors to assume that any securities offered for sale
were "entitled to be marketed.'' 5 3 The court noted that three other cir-
cuits, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth, had adopted various forms of the
fraud on the market theory of liability for lOb-5 actions and elected to
join this trend with the Raney case.
5 4
B. The Reliance Requirement in 1Ob-5 Actions
The traditional measure for causation in a private action under SEC
Rule lOb-5 is the plaintiff's actual reliance on the defendant's misrepre-
sentations. 5 5 In a misrepresentation case, the plaintiff must affirmatively
allege and prove that he relied on false representations made by the
defendant. The reliance requirement is fulfilled if "the misrepresenta-
tion is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which
results in [the investors'] loss.''56 In nondisclosure or omission cases,
this standard requires the plaintiff to show he relied to his detriment on
factors which were not revealed to him. Because this burden of proof
was difficult to sustain, the Supreme Court established a presumption of
reliance in favor of the plaintiff which arises after the plaintiff establishes
the materiality of the undisclosed facts.5 7 Materiality is established by
51. 717 F.2d at 1333.
52. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
53. Id. at 471.
54. 717 F.2d at 1332 (citing Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 71-76); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981)
(discussed infra at text accompanying notes 80-87); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th
Cir. 1975) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 60-68)).
55. The elements of a classic lOb-5 violation are: (1) a false representation made by
defendant; (2) with defendant's scienter; (3) the false representation is material; (4) plain-
tiffjustifiably relied on the false representation; (5) plaintiff purchased or sold securities in
connection with the false representation; and (6) plaintiff was damaged as a result of the
false representation. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); Holds-
worth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955
(1977). See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 88
HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975).
56. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir.) (bracketed infor-
mation in the original) (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.)
(quoting Restatement of Torts § 546 (1938)), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 2004 (1971).
57. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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proving that a reasonable man might have considered the undisclosed
facts important in making his decision. 58 The presumption of causation
is not conclusive; it merely shifts the burden of proof of non-reliance to
the defendant. The defendant meets his burden by showing that the
plaintiff's investment decision would not have been different even if the
defendant had disclosed the omitted facts.
5 9
Proving reliance is equally difficult where the alleged fraud has af-
fected the market and consequently injured the plaintiff. The fraud on
the market theory recognizes that investors make their decisions based
on a variety of factors, some unrelated to specific statements made to
investors about the investment, including the securities' presence in a
reliable market. A literal interpretation of the reliance element would
compel the plaintiff to prove reliance on specific actions or false repre-
sentations of the defrauder rather than the effects of such actions or rep-
resentations on the market. Those circuits which recognize the fraud on
the market theory of liability do not require proof of direct reliance on a
particular false representation to sustain a lOb-5 claim. A presumption
of reliance on the integrity of the market arises when the plaintiff estab-
lishes the materiality of the false representations, and the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to prove non-reliance by plaintiff upon the
market or non-materiality of the false representations.
C. The Fraud on the Market Theory of Liability
The leading case addressing the fraud on the market theory is
Blackie v. Barrack. 60 In Blachie, the plaintiffs, stock purchasers in the sec-
ondary market, filed a class action suit claiming that the defendant cor-
poration issued false annual and interim reports, press releases, and
SEC filings as to its financial condition which affected the price they paid
for the shares. The Ninth Circuit, in effect, extended the presumption
of reliance created by the Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States,6 1 for nondisclosure actions to cases involving misrepre-
sentations that inflate the price of stock traded on the open market.6 2 It
is not necessary to show direct reliance to establish causation in this con-
text. Causation is established by showing that plaintiffs purchased stock
in the secondary market and that the misrepresentations which distorted
the stock's value were material. 6 3 The burden then shifts to the defend-
ant to disprove causation by disproving materiality; by showing that
even though the false representation was material, a nominal number of
traders relied on it; or by showing that the purchaser acted without
58. Id. at 154.
59. Id. at 153-54.
60. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
61. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
62. 524 F.2d at 906 n.22. The court declined to interpret Affiliated Ute as creating a
presumption of reliance in lOb-5 actions. Instead, it viewed reliance based upon material-
ity as a threshhold of causation.
63. Id. at 906. "[C]ausation is adequately established in the impersonal stock ex-
change context by proof of purchase and of materiality of misrepresentation, without di-
rect proof of reliance." Id
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knowledge of the false character of the representation, or that he would
have acted in the same manner had he known of it. 6 4 The court's ration-
ale was that an investor relies generally on the market to reflect valid
stock prices, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations un-
derlying the stock price.6 5 The court reasoned that to require proof of
direct reliance would defeat claims where reliance is indirect, even
though the misrepresentations were material and causation was estab-
lished.6 6 The extension of the Affiliated Ule presumption in this case alle-
viated the "unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden" 6 7 of the
traditional reliance requirement. The court believed this holding would
facilitate enforcement of securities laws and encourage complete recov-
eries by plaintiffs with valid claims.
68
The Ninth Circuit expanded the fraud on the market theory beyond
reliance on the integrity of the market to reflect accurate stock values in
Arthur Young & Co. v. United States District Court.69 Here, plaintiffs alleged
that false and misleading registration statements and prospectuses filed
with the SEC were sent or shown to every investor who relied on them
to his detriment in the purchase of limited partnership interests pro-
moted by the defendant. There were 1215 investors represented in this
class action. The court determined that plaintiffs were entitled to rely
on the integrity of the regulatory process to produce truthful filing
statements.
70
In Panzirer v. Wolf,7 1 the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff
stated a cognizable fraud on the market claim based on her reliance on
the integrity of the market in producing the information reported in the
Wall Street Journal. She established a chain of causation by alleging that if
the corporation's annual report had been accurate, the stock analysts
interviewed by the Journal would not have commented positively on the
company, the Journal would not have reported favorably on the com-
pany's prospects, and she would not have relied on the article and
purchased the company's stock.7 2 The court determined that plaintiff
established reliance by showing that she acted in response to informa-
tion based on a material misrepresentation or omission transmitted by
reporters or workers in the securities markets. 73 To prove causation,
64. Id.
65. 524 F.2d at 907.
66. Id. "Requiring direct proof from each purchaser that he relied on a particular
representation when purchasing would defeat recovery by those whose reliance was indi-
rect, despite the fact that the causational chain is broken only if the purchaser would have
purchased the stock even had he known of the misrepresentation." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
70. Id. at 695. Plaintiff had a right to rely "on the integrity of the regulatory process
and the truth of any representations made to appropriate agencies and the investors at the
time of original issue."
71. 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982).
72. Id. at 367.
73. Id. "Where the plaintiff acts upon information from those working in or reporting
on the securities markets, and where that information is circulated after a material misrep-
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the plaintiff was required to show that the defendant's fraud was a "sub-
stantial factor" or "significant contributing cause"
74 of her injury. 75
The court analogized to the Blackie opinion, stating that just as a mate-
rial misrepresentation or omission is presumed to affect the price of
stock, so it should be presumed to affect the information "heard on the
street" which leads investors to make purchases in the secondary stock
market.
76
Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc.,77 mentioned in Raney as con-
flicting 78 yet not distinguished, is not based upon the "entitled to be
marketed/fraud on the market theory" alleged in Raney. The plaintiff
did not allege that the bonds were not entitled to be on the market, but
instead that the bonds were distributed with a fraudulently prepared of-
fering statement containing affirmative misrepresentations which dis-
torted their value. Thus, this opinion is not controlling or persuasive to
Raney. Vervaecke sought compensation for the decline in value of the
bonds measured by the difference between their cost and their present
fair market value. He attempted to classify his claims as involving non-
disclosure to benefit from the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance, but
the court determined that the plaintiffs alleged material misrepresenta-
tions and omissions in the nature of misrepresentations under clause (2)
of Rule 1 Ob-5, to which the Affiliated Ute presumption did not apply. The
court also declined to distinguish or discuss Blackie which, arguably, is
persuasive in this context. Vervaecke was unable to sustain his burden
of proof of reliance on the misrepresentations because he did not view
the offering circular until after he committed to purchase the bonds.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment
against his claim.
7 9
The most persuasive authority for the holding in Raney is Shores v.
Sklar,80 a class action suit brought by purchasers of industrial revenue
bonds following their default. A distinctly divided en banc Fifth Circuit
panel 8 ' allowed the class to maintain a claim under 10b-5(1) and lOb-
5(3) based on a variation of the fraud on the market theory which allows
the investor to rely on the integrity of the market to the extent that the
securities offered for sale to him must be ones which are entitled to be in
the marketplace. The complaint alleged that the bonds were marketed
under a fraudulent scheme so pervasive, that without it, the bonds
would not have been offered on the market at any price. The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's summary judgment against Shores' lOb-
resentation or omission, plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim of reliance on the
mispresentation."
74. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir.
1976).
75. Panzirer, 663 F.2d at 367.
76. Id. at 368.
77. 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978).
78. 717 F.2d at 1333.
79. 578 F.2d at 720.
80. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. 12 in the majority, 10 in the dissent.
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5(2) claim based on an offering circular which was, allegedly, defective
because it contained material misrepresentations and omissions.
Shores' admission that he purchased the bonds based solely on his bro-
ker's oral representations and that he had not read or otherwise relied
on the offering circular operated to disprove reliance, a necessary ele-
ment in his claim under lOb-5(2).
The Shores majority interpreted the plaintiff's complaint as alleging
that "fraud on a broader scale" 8 2 caused the bonds to be offered for sale
on the market. Thus, it was the presence of the bonds in the market-
place that was challenged, not the effect of the offering circular on the
purchasers' decisions to invest. The majority classified the offering cir-
cular as only one element of the overall scheme to defraud and held that
nonreliance on this one component was not fatal to the claim. The court
determined that plaintiff's burden of proof was to establish: (1) that de-
fendant fraudulently marketed securities, (2) that he reasonably relied
on the bonds' presence in the market to represent their legitimacy, and
(3) that he was injured as a result of the fraudulent scheme.
8 3
The dissent's examination of the case law found that clauses (1) and
(3) of Rule 1Ob-5 have been applied in situations where clause (2) is
inappropriate. 84 The language of clause (2) is specific, requiring the
making of an untrue statement of a material fact or the omission of a
material fact necessary to render the statements made not misleading.
The first and third clauses are phrased less restrictively to include "any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or "any act, practice, or course
of business which operates . . . as a fraud .... 85 The dissent con-
cluded that clauses (1) and (3) were drafted broadly to include fraudu-
lent activities not covered by the particular language of clause (2).
The dissent criticized the majority's position in sustaining the plain-
tiff's claims under lOb-5(l) and lOb-5(3) as permitting allegations of
misconduct in connection with the preparation and distribution of a mis-
leading offering circular covered by lOb-5(2) to be recognized as causes
of action under clauses (1) and (3) because of extensive allegations of
collateral misconduct. The dissent argued that the majority allowed the
plaintiff to circumvent the traditional reliance requirement of clause
(2)86 by acknowledging an "entitled to be marketed/fraud on a broader
82. 647 F.2d at 472.
83. Id. at 469-70.
84. Id. at 473-74 (Randall, J., writing for the dissent).
85. Rule lOb-5 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, .
(a) to employ any device, scheme, of artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
86. List, 340 F.2d at 462. The traditional reliance requirement is "whether the mis-
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scale" theory of recovery despite the plaintiffs admitted lack of reliance
on the offering circular.
8 7
While the majority interpreted the primary purpose of the securities
laws to be the protection of investors and the promotion of free and
honest securities markets achieved through full disclosure and other
means, the dissent determined that the fundamental purpose of the Acts
was to fully disclose the terms of the transaction to the investor allowing
him to make an informed investment decision. From the dissent's per-
spective, the majority's validation of plaintiffs lOb-5 claim, despite his
admitted nonreliance on the offering circular proffered to promote full
disclosure, contradicted the philosophy of the Acts. The dissent be-
lieved that the majority position would allow plaintiffs to recover in
some instances, even though they did not read or rely on the defend-
ants' public disclosures.
The Raney opinion acknowledges that the Shores' court was almost
equally divided in its decision, but makes only an abbreviated attempt to
address the concerns of the Shores' dissent. The primary concern is that
the presumption of reliance extended in Raney could operate as a
scheme of investor's insurance. When an investor successfully states a
claim under the "entitled to be marketed/fraud on the market" theory,
the issue of whether he took steps to protect his interest, namely by
reading an offering circular or a bond opinion, is irrelevant. The Shores'
dissent speculated that despite the material misrepresentations and
omissions in that offering circular, if the plaintiffs had read it, they would
have been warned by its patent defects. The Raney court does not dis-
cuss the degree of credibility of the bond opinion or offering circular.
The investor need only establish that he "reasonably relied on the avail-
ability of the bonds as indicating their lawful issue" 88 to establish
causation.
Raney cited Arthur Young & Co. to illustrate the expansion of the
fraud on the market theory to "reliance to the integrity of the regulatory
process and the truth of any representation made to appropriate agen-
cies and the investors at the time of original issue,"'8 9 but omitted the
truthfulness clause in its discussion of the case. The Raney court rea-
soned that investors are entitled to rely on federal and state securities
regulations to produce lawfully issued securities. The court, however,
attached a broad disclaimer which significantly eroded its rationale. The
court did not grant investors the right to rely on the truthfulness of the
offering circular. Despite this disclaimer, the court believed its holding
did not create a "scheme of investors' insurance."
90
If the Raney holding does not allow an investor to rely on the truth-
fulness of the statements made in the disclosure documents, then it pro-
representation is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in
. . .loss." See Raney, 717 F.2d at 1332.
87. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 481-87 (Randell,J., writing for the dissent).
88. 717 F.2d at 1333.
89. 549 F.2d at 695.
90. 717 F.2d at 1333 (quoting List, 340 F.2d at 463).
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tects the investor who neglects or declines to read a patently erroneous
offering circular. While Arthur Young & Co. protects investors who actu-
ally read deceptively misleading disclosure statements, Raney extends
protection to investors who may or may not have read disclosure state-
ments which may or may not be patently misleading. Federal securities
regulations require disclosure statements to provide investors with in-
formation on which to base their decisions. It is difficult to rationalize
how the protection offered by Raney to investors who do not read disclo-
sure documents does not establish a scheme of investors' insurance
when the disclosure documents are patently erroneous when read by the
reasonable investor or securities broker.
The Tenth Circuit sustained Raney's lOb-5 claim under the guise of
a "fraud on the market" theory. The label attached to this theory of
liability implies two premises: (1) an actionable fraud, (2) which is per-
petrated on a market. Raney established a sufficient claim under Rule
lOb-5, but the opinion does not reflect any evidence introduced to show
this fraud was practiced on a market. The customary interpretation of
the term "market" in the context of securities transactions is based on
the concept of an organized forum where securities are actively traded.
It is composed of a primary market for original issues and a secondary
market where prices are determined by supply and demand. The securi-
ties in Raney were Irrigation Fuel Authority Bonds purchased by sixty
local investors at their original issue. The bonds did not have a secon-
dary market and their value and selling price were calculated from their
bond rating. There was no market for the bonds in the commonly ac-
cepted sense. The cases prior to Shores applied the fraud on the market
theory to claims involving actively traded securities. 9 1 The "entitled to
be marketed/fraud on the market theory" created in Shores and accepted
in Raney is a misnomer. A fraud was committed, but not on a market.
The fraud was committed on the bond investors themselves.
Lynn Bolinske
91. Blackie and Panzirer involved stock purchases in the secondary market. Arthur
Young & Co. involved 1215 investors in limited partnership interests which were promoted
as tax shelters.
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